[73]
Why did the 13
May riots occur? Tunku Abdul Rahman placed the blame squarely on the communists
and Chinese secret society elements.1
However, Tun
(Dr.) Ismail, Minister of Home Affairs, seemed to think otherwise, at least,
about the communists. 'Everybody thought that the Communists were responsible
for the disturbances,' he said. 'Later we found that they were as much
surprised as we were.'2 In a separate statement made soon after the
riots, he said, 'Democracy is dead in this country. It died at the hands of the
opposition parties who triggered off the events leading to this violence.'3
Later Chinese secret societies were blamed, then mention was made of
'anti-national and subversive elements'.4
But the fact
remains, when all is said and done, that in Malay eyes, all of these culprits
were Chinese.
The National
Operations Council report on the racial disturbances, published on 9 October
1969, which represents the official view, while alluding to the role of the
Malayan Communist Party and Chinese secret societies, made play of several
other factors. These included differences in the interpretation of the
constitution by Malays and non-Malays, and the resentment of 'certain immigrant
races'5 against constitutional provisions relating to Malay special
rights and the status accorded to the Malay language, especially under sections
152 and 153 of the constitution. Section 152 provided for the Malay language to
be the national language (Bahasa Malaysia),
and ultimately the sole official language, which meant, of course, that
English, Chinese and Tamil would all be relegated to an inferior position.
Article 153 covered the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to
safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of
other communities.
The NOC Report
also adverted to the stirring up of racial feelings during the election
campaign, presumably by both the Alliance
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[74]
and the opposition parties, and
the racial insults and threats which were expressed during the DAP and Gerakan
'victory parades' in Kuala Lumpur.6
Although this
did not find a place in the NOC Report, there was, too, a reluctance on the
part of the younger generation of Chinese to accept the 'bargain' which had
been entered into with UMNO by the 'old guard' of the MCA, and Chinese
resentment at what they perceived to be the 'Malaysia for the Malays' policy
pursued by the Alliance government.
On the Malay
side, there was a deep-rooted sense of frustration at being left behind in the
modernization process which was taking place in their own country, and a fear
that they would be smothered by non-Malays, both numerically and economically.
They were determined not to give up their rights and heritage as defined under
the constitution lest they should be 'reduced to the status of Red Indians
striving to live in the wastelands of America',7 and probably,
unconsciously, there was a reaffirmation of their exclusive sense of community
now that Islam, under the constitution, had been granted official recognition
as the state religion.
In 1970, the
government acknowledged that the riots were caused by 'ethnic polarization and
animosity', which is another way of saying that the Malays and Chinese did not
get on well together, and by continuing Malay grievances at being at a disadvantage
economically compared with the Chinese.8
The National
Operations Council, which had been delegated executive authority to administer
the country, consisted of six Malays and two non-Malays, with Tun Abdul Razak
as Director of Operations. The Malay members were Tun (Dr.) Ismail, Minister of
Home Affairs; Datuk Hamzah, Minister of Information and Broadcasting; Tan Sri
Ghazalie Shafie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Tan Sri
Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin, Director of Public Services; General Tengku Osman Jiwa,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; and Tan Sri Mohammad Salleh,
Inspector-General of Police. The Chief Executive Officer was Lieutenant-General
Dato Ibrahim. The inclusion of military and police representatives is
noteworthy, and as the council came to be involved not only in reestablishing
law and order but also in the exercise of wide executive and legislative
powers, which normally fall outside the province of the armed forces, it was to
lead to rumours later on of the possibility of a military takeover.
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[75]
The two
non-Malay members were Tun Tan Siew Sin, MCA president, and Tun V.T.
Sambanthan, MIC president.9
The new
Emergency Cabinet formed on 20 May 1969 by Tunku Abdul Rahman, as mentioned
previously, was superior to the NOC, and Tun Razak had to act on the prime
minister's (the Tunku's) advice. The ministers appointed to the cabinet were
Tunku Abdul Rahman (Prime Minister); Tun Abdul Razak (Deputy Prime Minister,
Defence and acting Finance); Tun (Dr.) Ismail (Home Affairs); Tan Sri Sardon
(Health); Mohamed Khir Johari (Commerce and Industry, and acting Local
Government and Housing); Tuan Haji Mohamed Ghazali (Agriculture and
Cooperatives); Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Haji Ya'akub (Education); Ghafar Baba
(National and Rural Development, and Lands and Mines); Hamzah Abu Samah
(Information and Broadcasting); Tan Sri Fatimah binte Haji Hashim (Social
Welfare); Dato Ganie Gilong (Justice); Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah (Sarawak
Affairs); Tun V.T. Sambanthan (Works, Posts and Telecommunications); and V.
Manickavasagam (Labour and acting Transport).
The next day it
was announced that three MCA members would join the Cabinet as Ministers
without Portfolio. They were Tun Tan Siew Sin (former Minister of Finance),
Khaw Kai Boh, and Lee Siok Yiew.10
It will be
recalled that there was a move afoot at the hurriedly called meeting of UMNO
campaign directors after the elections to propose that Malay ministers should
be appointed to take over the portfolios of Finance and Commerce and Industry
and, in this connection, the assumption of Tun Razak and Mohamed Khir Johari of
these two portfolios is significant.
In the aftermath
of the riots, there had been virtually a breakdown of social and economic
contact between the Chinese and Malays. In June, few Chinese and Indians were
willing to patronize Malay shops, stalls or hawkers. Non-Malays refused to ride
in taxis driven by Malays, buy batik
cloth, or even eat durians, which were regarded as 'Malay' fruit. There was
still 'bad blood' between the two races. In the background, the more vocal
Malays were struggling to assume control of UMNO so that they could prevent
UMNO from making concessions. 'There is no denying the fact that there is a
struggle for power going on inside UMNO', the Tunku commented, 'as between
those who built the Party and helped in our independence and the new elements,
the 'Ultras'11
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[76]
On 12 June 1969,
it was officially announced that all non-citizens were required to obtain work
permits even if they were permanent residents of the country, and aliens would
be granted work permits only if there were not sufficient qualified bumiputras
to fill the jobs.12 In November 1969, all citizens (i.e. non-Malays)
issued citizenship certificates under section 30 of the constitution, that is,
on the grounds that one of their parents was a citizen or domiciled in the
country at the time of their birth, were required to submit their citizenship
papers to the authorities for checking to make sure that they were not obtained
under false pretences. Only 95,540 such certificates were cleared by March
1971, and 181,160 non-Malays had their citizenship revoked or were left holding
invalid citizenship certificates.13
On 30 July 1969
the Minister of Education announced a plan to introduce Bahasa Malaysia in
stages, starting from Primary One in 1970, as the main medium of instruction in
Peninsular Malaysia schools. English was to be taught only as a second
language. On this time-scale, by 1982 all secondary education, including Form
Six would be in the medium of Bahasa Malaysia, and beyond that, starting in
1983, Bahasa Malaysia would be the medium of instruction in first-year
university classes, and would be introduced progressively year by year until
all university classes would use Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of instruction,
except for teaching foreign languages.14
The reasoning
behind this was that Malay was regarded as the means to create national unity.
While it was conceded that English was widely spoken in Malaysia, it was
considered to be 'elitist’, and national dignity dictated that an autochthonous
language should be given pride of place. Chinese and Tamil were, in this sense,
not thought of as being indigenous languages, and their continued use was regarded
as only tending to encourage polarization of the various communities.15
On 18 June 1969,
Tunku Abdul Rahman received what he described as a 'scurrilous' letter16
from Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, an UMNO candidate who was defeated in the
federal elections, and a member of UMNO's supreme council, accusing the Tunku
of being pro-Chinese, and demanding his resignation as prime minister. This
letter was leaked to the press so that it received the widest possible
publicity. University of Malaya students demonstrated on the university campus
calling for the Tunku's resignation on the grounds that he was not taking a
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[77]
strong enough line with the
Chinese over such matters as education and language, and that he had failed to
improve the economic position of the Malays.17 There was a spate of
vicious letters which were just as much anti-Tunku as they were anti-Chinese.
Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad, a medical practitioner with a private practice in Kedah, was the most
prominent of a group of relatively young UMNO intellectuals who believed that
not enough was being done for the Malays. Another name mentioned in this
connection was Musa Hitam (later Datuk), who had recently been appointed as an
Assistant Minister to Tun Abdul Razak.
The 'Young Turks'
worked closely with persons such as Tan Sri Ja'afar Albar and Tan Sri Syed
Nasir, who were considered by many to belong to the 'ultras' camp.18
Both the 'Young Turks' and the 'ultras' were reported to be anti-Tunku Abdul
Rahman and his supporters, and as Malay nationalists they had a reputation for
being uncompromising towards non-Malays.
At this time, a
lecturer in Malay Studies at the University of Malaya, Raja Mukhtaruddin Dain,
came to notice for circulating a leaflet entitled 'Message to the Malays',
which was banned under the Internal Security Act, together with the other
documents referred to above, for fear of exacerbating a situation which was
already tense, and which could easily lead to a further outbreak of violence.
It was clear
that some UMNO members wanted to impose one-party rule and exclude the Chinese
completely from the government.
It was just as
well for the Chinese that all these pressures were resisted. Dr. Mahathir was
expelled from UMNO for breach of party discipline, Musa Hitam was dismissed
from his post as assistant minister, and sent on 'study leave' to Britain, and
the police held the university students in check.19
'The ultras
believe in the wild and fantastic theory of absolute dominion by one race over
the other communities regardless of the Constitution', Tun (Dr.) Ismail said
over Television Malaysia on 2 August 1969. 'The moderates under the leadership
of the Tunku firmly hold the view that in the Malaysian multiracial society,
such a theory is not just a harmless pipe dream but an extremely dangerous
fantasy.
'Polarization
has taken place in Malaysian politics and the extreme racialists among the
ruling party are making a desperate
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[78]
bid to topple the present
leadership.
'I must warn the
extremists and others as well, that if the anti-Tunku campaigns or activities
are carried out in such a manner ... as to cause undue fear and alarm among
members of any community ... I will not hesitate to exercise my powers under
the law against those responsible....'20
Then the Tunku
lambasted the 'ultras' and extremists in no uncertain fashion. 'Firstly I am a
Malay,' he said, 'and naturally I am their leader. But I have to see to the
interests of the non-Malays too. We just cannot throw them into the sea.'21
The turning
point came when the General Officer Commanding, Peninsular Malaysia, took an
oath on 2 August 1969 on behalf of his officers and men to pledge loyalty to
and support for the Tunku and his government.22
This may well
have saved the day both for the Tunku and his supporters (as well as the
Chinese), because at that time, when parliament was suspended and a state of
emergency had been declared, in the final analysis, power rested with the
military, and whoever controlled the military, controlled the country.
The Tunku
survived as a multiracial symbol, and a positive step was made to patch up the
differences between the three main races making up Malaysia, by the
establishment of three new institutions. In July 1969, National Goodwill
Councils came into existence all over Malaysia with various local committees.
The president was the Tunku who started a six-week, nation-wide tour by
visiting Penang, where the state government was in the hands of Gerakan, with
Dr Lim Chong Eu as chief minister. Malays, Chinese and Indians could talk to
each other again and a start was made to restore an intercommunal dialogue.
In January 1970,
the Department of National Unity and the National Consultative Council came
into being; they were more formal and had official links with the NOC.24
The National Consultative Council was foreshadowed in the National Operations
Council's Report wherein it was stated that 'it is intended after the
publication of this Report to invite representatives of various groups in the
country — political, religious, economic and others — to serve on a
Consultative Council, where issues affecting our national unity will be
discussed fully and frankly... ,'25
Its task was to
determine 'permanent solutions to our racial problems to ensure that the May 13
tragedy does not recur',26 It
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[79]
met periodically over the next
eighteen months.
In some ways,
the National Consultative Council was the alter
ego of parliament, which was waiting in the wings, and it was by no means
certain that when parliament was reconvened the NCC would necessarily disappear
(see below).
It was a
multiracial body consisting of 65 members representing federal and state
governments, political parties (with the exception of DAP and Party Rakyat),
and functional groups, who were encouraged to speak frankly on matters of
national importance such as racial issues and national unity,
The NOC Report
had already pointed out the way Sino-Malay friction could be met. 'Citizens of
this country,' it said, 'especially those who became citizens by virtue of the
provisions that started with the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, leading
to the Merdeka Constitution, 1957, should understand the significance of the
entrenched provisions of the Constitution. Malaysians, despite their ethnic
origins, should appreciate the potential and distinctiveness of their country.
The guidelines will be provided by the newly-formed Department of National
Unity and the National Operations Council.'27
The intention to
prepare guidelines in the shape of a national ideology was announced by Tan Sri
Ghazali in mid-July 1969. The drafting was done by the Department of National
Unity headed by Ghazali, and the final draft was submitted to the National
Consultative Council for approval.28
On 31 August
1970, the thirteenth anniversary of Merdeka, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong formally
promulgated the statement of national ideology which was called the Rukunegara. While 'rukun' certainly has Islamic undertones about it, and may be
translated as 'fundamental doctrine, commandment, or essential part of a
religion', as brought out by Means and Milne and Mauzy,29 it is
indeed very appropriate in the context of interracial relations, as it means,
too, 'quiet and peaceful', 'like the ideal relationship of friendship',
'without quarrel or strife', and 'united in purpose while mutually helping each
other'.30 'Negara' means
nation.
As the Malaysian
government intends to use the Rukunegara
as the basic model for its strategy to bring about national unity, and the
principles enunciated in it are meant to serve as a bond to bind together the
various strands of Malaysia's multiracial society, it may be of interest to
reproduce it here:
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[80]
'Our Nation, MALAYSIA, is
dedicated —
- To achieving a
greater unity for all her peoples;
- To maintaining a
democratic way of life;
- To creating a
just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably distributed;
- To ensuring a
liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions;
- To building a progressive
society which shall be orientated to modern science and technology.
We, her peoples,
pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by these principles —
- Belief in God
(Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan)
- Loyalty to King
and Country (Kesetiaan kepada Raja dan Negara)
- Upholding the
Constitution (Keluhuran Perlembagaan)
- Rule of Law
(Kedaulatan Undang-undang)
- Good Behaviour
and Morality (Kesopanan dan Kesusilaan).'
The following commentary
elucidating the meaning of these five principles accompanied the declaration:
1.
Islam is the official religion of the
Federation. Other religions and beliefs may be practised in peace and harmony
and there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the gvound of
religion.
2.
The loyalty that is expected of every citizen is
that he must be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty the Yang
di-Pertuan Agong....
3.
It is the duty of a citizen to respect and
appreciate the letter, the spirit and the historical background of the
Constitution. This historical background led to such provisions as those
regarding the position of ... the Rulers, the position of Islam as the official
religion, the position of Malays and other Natives, the legitimate interests of
other communities, and conferment of citizenship. It is the sacred duty of a
citizen to defend and uphold the Constitution.
4.
Justice is founded upon the rule of law. Every
citizen is equal before the law. Fundamental liberties are guaranteed to all
citizens. These include liberty of the person, equal protection of the law,
freedom of religion, rights of property and protection against banishment. The
Constitution confers on a citizen the right of free speech, assembly and
association and this right may be enjoyed freely subject only to limitations
imposed by law.
5.
Individuals and groups shall conduct their
affairs in such a manner as not to violate any of the accepted canon of
behaviour which is arrogant or offensive to the sensitivities of any group. No
citizen should question the loyalty of another citizen on the ground that he
belongs to a particular community.31
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[81]
In the
circumstances, non-Malays could take heart that the Rukunegara steered a middle path through the tangled skein of
Sino-Malay relations. A clear hint was given in it to Malay 'ultras' and racial
extremists that they were not going to have things entirely their own way, and
that parliamentary democracy was to continue and a totalitarian form of
government was not envisaged. The Chinese were reassured that there would be no
threat to their culture ('ensuring a liberal approach to her (Malaysia's) rich
and diverse cultural traditions'), and the direction in which education would
be pointed was indicated ('a progressive society which shall be oriented to
modern science and technology').
The third
principle, 'upholding the Constitution', made it clear that the Chinese would
have to accept Malay as the national language and the sole official language,
as well as accept the 'special position' of the bumiputras and the legitimate interests of other communities.
However, the fifth principle was in favour of the Chinese — 'no citizen should
question the loyalty of another citizen on the ground that he belongs to a
particular community'.
The Rukunegara was supported by all legal
political parties, and its principles became widely known and were often
referred to and quoted.
At the time of
the promulgation of the Rukunegara,
Tunku Abdul Rahman had announced that he intended to retire from the
premiership which he had held since independence, and on 22 September 1970 he
formally submitted his resignation to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and Tun Abdul
Razak assumed office.
At the same time
that he had announced his retirement, the Tunku had remarked on the
government's intention to lift the suspension on parliament and the various
state legislatures in February 1971.
Tun Razak
appointed Tun (Dr.) Ismail as Deputy Prime Minister, and Datuk Hussein Onn, who
was his brother-in-law, left his private law practice at Tun Razak's request to
serve the nation as Minister of Education. The MCA abandoned its decision not
to participate in the government, and Tun Tan Siew Sin returned as Minister of
Finance.32
Once again the
Alliance Party was at the helm, made up as before of three communal parties,
UMNO, the MCA and the MIC, although it was now geared toward a new strategy to
meet the interrelated problems of the economic deprivation of the Malays and
the hostility and ill-feeling which was keeping the
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[82]
Malays and Chinese apart.
The ban on party
politics was withdrawn but only after the NOC, with the full support of the
National Consultative Council, amended the Sedition Act to make it an offence
to question publicly the powers and privileges of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or
the Malay rulers, the citizenship law, the use of Malay as the sole national
and official language, the 'special position' and rights of the bumiputras, and the status of Islam as
the state religion.33
On 23 February
1971, the new parliament was opened, marking the end of twenty months of rule
by NOC decree. The new prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, addressed the Dewan
Rakyat as follows:
'Mr Speaker, we
meet today some twenty months late. I regret this as much as any Member of this
House, but we all know why this had to be. The disturbances of May 1969 mark
the darkest period in our national history ... Today life has generally
returned to normal ... (but) if we do not take precautions now, we shall stand
condemned before our people as failing in our duty ....'
Tun Abdul Razak
opined that the only way to avoid a recurrence of the trouble was to
restructure the whole economy so as to eradicate poverty for all Malaysians,
irrespective of race, and to correct racial economic imbalance by increasing
the participation of bumiputras in
the economic life of the country.34
Tun Razak made
it quite clear that the return to parliamentary government was contingent upon
parliament passing the Constitution (Amendment) Bill which was designed to
confirm the NOC decree amending the Sedition Act which made it an offence to
discuss publicly 'sensitive racial issues', and not only that, but to remove
parliamentary privilege in regard to the discussion of these topics both at
federal and state levels.
The Constitution
(Amendment) Bill also granted additional power to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to
direct post-secondary in stitutions to reserve certain proportions of places
for Malays in selected courses of study where the numbers of Malays were
disproportionately small, such as medicine, engineering and science.
After several
days of debate — the MCA supported the Bill but it was opposed by the DAP and
the PPP — the amendments to the constitution were passed by the Dewan Rakyat by
a vote of 126 to 17. The other House, the Dewan Negara (Senate), passed it
unanimously.35
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[83]
With the
resumption of parliamentary rule, the NOC continued as the National Security
Council, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak. The National
Consultative Council and the National Goodwill Council were amalgamated to form
a new multiracial advisory body called the 'National Unity Council'. This new
council had the task of advising the prime minister on the sensitive racial
issues, which were banned from parliamentary and public debate, and undertaking
research in race relations.
In a sense, the
new economic policy announced by Tun Abdul Razak at the opening of Parliament
was not entirely new. It will be recollected that General Templer, soon after
his arrival as High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya in February 1952,
had made reference to the necessity for the Malays 'to play a full part in the
economic life of the country' (see Chapter Six). However, for the most part, in
the First Malaysia Plan 1966—70, the
adjusting of the economic balance between the Malay and Chinese communities was
thought of in terms of developing the rural areas of the country, where most of
the Malays were found, as opposed to the urban areas, which were predominantly
Chinese settlements and schemes for land settlements benefiting the Malays were
thereupon devised by the government or quasi-government organizations mentioned
in Chapter Six, such as FELDA, RIDA and MARA.
Nevertheless, it
was reasoned that the efforts of these bodies were inadequate, and that too
little was being done for the Malays, otherwise the Malays would not have been
still labouring under a sense of economic deprivation which led to the 13 May
1969 riots,36 and it was with this in mind that a new economic
development plan, the Second Malaysia
Plan 1971—1975 (SMP) was drawn up, and published on 25 June 1971, with
further details and statistics being provided in the Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971—1975,
published on 20 November 1973. It was followed in 1976 by the Third Malaysia Plan 1976—1980.
The aims of the
New Economic Policy (NEP) were given in the introduction of the SMP. 'The Plan
incorporates a two-pronged New Economic Policy for development. The first prong
is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and
increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race.
The second prong aims at accelerating the pro-
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[84]
cess of restructuring Malaysian
society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate
the identification of race with economic function. This process involves the
modernisation of rural life, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities
and the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community in all
categories and at all levels of operation, so that Malays and other indigenous
people will become full partners in all respects of the economic life of the
nation.'37
The 'first
prong' of the NEP was to be achieved by comprehensive policies of economic
growth and development which would improve the lot of all Malaysians,
regardless of race. But, in practice, most of the specific measures to be taken
for the eradication of poverty affected the Malays, either in agriculture or in
assisting their movement from the traditional to the modern sector of the
economy.
The strategy to
be adopted for the 'second prong', that is, the restructuring of Malaysian
society to correct economic imbalance, was more far-reaching as it covered a
wide range of programmes to enable bumiputras
to participate in the dynamic sectors of the economy.
The Mid-Term Review stated that there would
be an increased scale of activities in agriculture and rural development,
commerce and industry, transport and the social sectors.38
With reference
to restructuring wealth ownership (see Appendix 6), foreign interests accounted
for 60 per cent of the total share capital in the corporate sector, and Chinese
ownership accounted for about 22 per cent or just under 60 per cent of the
total Malaysian share. In industries in which foreign interests were not
supreme, Chinese ownership of share capital topped the list amounting to
between 40 — 50 per cent. Bumiputra
ownership of share capital, on the other hand, was a mere 2 per cent of the
overall total.
The target laid
down to achieve a more balanced pattern in the ownership of assets in all
sectors of the economy was that within a period of 20 years, bumiputras would
own and manage at least 30 per cent of the total commercial and industrial
activities of the economy in all categories and scales of operations, as
related in Chapter Six.
There was great
difficulty in finding sufficient bumiputra
capital to take up the shares, but the government proposed to overcome this by
acquiring shares directly by government institu
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[85]
tions and holding them in trust
for bumiputras until they were in a position to purchase them with their own
capital.39
It was decided
that the employment pattern at all levels should reflect more closely the
racial composition of the population (see Appendix 1). For most industries, a
40 per cent quota figure was set for the employment of Malay staff although
this obviously depended on the availability of suitably trained and qualified
Malay personnel.40
Manufacturing
was to be the command sector in the expansion of the Malaysian economy, and
special attention was to be paid to the creation of a Malay commercial and
industrial community.41 The government's policy was to 'bring
industry to the Malays' rather than the other way round, and labour intensive
industrial projects which provided new employment opportunities in the rural
areas were to be started.42 These 'growth poles' in the rural areas
were to be enhanced by the provision of such amenities as schools, housing,
electricity, medical centres, transportation and communications.
The prime
minister appealed to Malays to go into business and not necessarily to aim at
'safe', comfortable jobs in government service, and to pay more attention to
science and technology, while not departing from the tenets of their faith.43
It was hoped to
bring into being a Malay entrepreneurial community 'within one generation' and,
as an incentive, bumiputra contractors were assured of being granted at least a
certain percentage of government and quasi-government contracts.44
But by 1970, the
number of bumiputras in the commercial sector was still disappointingly small
and amounted to only around 24 per cent of the total number of persons
employed, and a Sino-Malay Economic Cooperation Advisory Board which was set up
soon after the 13 May 1969 racial riots to encourage joint ventures between
Chinese and Malay businessmen came to nothing.45
It seemed that
in joint Sino-Malay business ventures, the Malay partner was often inclined to
assume the role of a 'sleeping partner', with his participation limited to
obtaining licences, quotas or tenders from the government, and allowing his
Chinese partner to take over from there and run the business. This was known as
an 'Ali-Baba' operation: 'Ali' standing for the Malay and 'Baba' for the
Chinese.
Actually, this
was quite understandable, as there were very few Malays with business
experience and know-how, who felt at home
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[86]
in the world of finance and
business, as traditionally Malays attached greater prestige to working in the
government sector, even though it might be only as a clerical worker or a peon (office-boy).
The government
or quasi-govemment agencies and corporations had a more important function to
perform in the NEP than they had under the First
Malaysia Plan, and the Mid-Term
Review of the Second Malaysia Plan is replete with acronyms such as MARA (Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat or Council of
Trust for the Indigenous People), PERNAS (Perbadanan
National or State Trading Corporation), UDA (Urban Development Authority)
and SEDC (State Economic Development Corporation). All these bodies were formed
by the government to assist and to guide bumiputras
to play a fuller part in the economic life of post-13 May 1969 Malaysia, and
were all part of the grand strategy 'to restructure Malaysian society' in order
'to correct racial economic imbalance', in the context of an expanding economy,
and 'to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with
economic function'.46
The long-term
plan was to hand over the business enterprises started by these agencies to
bumiputras, although when and how this would be effected was not made clear in
the SMP. In this connection, it will be recollected that by 1971 MARA had formed
and handed over some bus services to Malay concerns (see Chapter Six).
Education as a
'tool for restructuring society' was another matter accorded priority in the
SMP. Mention has been made earlier of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill which
gave the paramount ruler power to direct universities and other institutions of
higher learning to admit more bumiputras,
even though their educational qualifications might be lower than that of
non-Malay candidates, especially in the fields of medicine, engineering and
science. However, there were problems. While the University of Malaya at Kuala
Lumpur was able to expand its physical facilities to take in the increased
enrolment, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia) and
Universiti Sains Malaysia, did not have either sufficient facilities or
teachers to do so. There were 8,052 students at the University of Malaya in the
1970-1 session. Of these 1,363 were in Science, 631 ir Medicine, 392 in
Engineering and 324 in Agriculture. Universiti Sains, Penang, began with an
intake of 60 science students
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[87]
in 1969 and by 1970 — 1 the
enrolment had increased to 262.47 Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia was
established in May 1970 with an intake of 191 students. It was the first university
in the country to use Malay as the medium of instruction.48
With the
reconvening of parliament on 23 February 1971, it appeared to be tacitly
accepted by both Malays and Chinese that to question the assumptions of the NEP
would only open old wounds and, in any case, the government repeatedly
emphasized that in the implementation of the NEP it would ensure that 'no
particular group will experience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation'.49
This had to be accepted at its face value and a chance given to see whether the
new strategies to promote national unity would work.
What of the
position then, of the Chinese after the bloody 13 May 1969 disturbances? The
'bargain' which had been entered into by the MCA and UMNO prior to independence
in 1957 aimed at creating a balance which would be adhered to by both Chinese
and Malays. This had been shattered during the 13 May 1969 riots. What are the
prospects of the two main communities in Malaysia working out a modus vivendi? There are many barriers
which have persisted since the Chinese first started to immigrate to Malaya in
large numbers in the second half of the nineteenth century. For instance, they
do not share a common history, heritage or culture, and even their language,
dress, food, daily habits, religious beliefs and economic pursuits are
different. They do not 'dream the same dreams'.
By 1971, it
appeared that there were three options open to the Chinese in a
Malayan-Malaysia. They could be assimilated, depending on whether they agreed
to turn themselves into Malays, or they could be integrated into Malaysian
society to form a suku (literally a
quarter' or 'a group’), that is, a Chinese-Malaysian and not a
Malaysian-Chinese suku, which would
nevertheless be part of the racial mosaic making up Malaysia, in the same way
that Malaysia includes the separate ethnic groups of Sabah and Sarawak, such
as, the Melanaus, Ibans (Sea Dayaks), Land Dayaks, Dusuns, Muruts and Bajaus.
Or they could remain separate and outside the mainstream of Malaysian life, in which
case further friction could be expected which would inevitably lead to further
outbreaks of racial violence, and perhaps rend the country asunder.
It appears
unlikely that the Chinese will accept the first option,
Aftermath | 13 May 1969
[88]
bearing in mind their intense
pride in their culture. Even in Thailand where the Chinese and Thais come from
the same stock, and there are no religious barriers between the two races,
assimilation is by no means complete. In any case, in Malaysia, Islam would present
an insuperable obstacle, since there can be no compromise over this, and it
constitutes the main reason why Malaysia, with its multiracial society, has not
become the melting pot of Asia. The third option is unthinkable, and even the
most chauvinistic Chinese realizes that it would not be possible for the
Chinese to remain as a separate enclave in a Malay-oriented Malaysia.
Integration
would therefore seem to offer the best solution,50 and it would be
quite acceptable in the context of the Rukunegara
where, as has been noted earlier, reference has been made to Malaysia's 'rich
and diverse cultural traditions'. Also, the NEP, if it is accepted to mean what
it says, makes it quite clear that the government 'will spare no efforts to
promote national unity and develop a just and progressive Malaysian society in
a rapidly expanding economy so that no one will experience any loss or feel any
sense of deprivation of his rights, privileges, income, job or opportunity'.51
Meanwhile, while
the frequent verbal battles between the two main component parties of the
ruling political alliance, namely, UMNO and MCA, must indeed give rise to
widespread anxiety, there is no doubt that the government's language and
education policies provide the key to the problem. Although they were initially
firmly resisted by the Chinese, if they come to be accepted, they will
eventually result in producing Chinese-Malaysians52 educated through
the medium of Bahasa Malaysia (the national language) and having a Malaysian
outlook, even though this may take some years to achieve, and the way ahead may
be tortuous.
"Bahawa
di dalam perjalanan manusia tidak ada suatu bangsa pun yang boleh
menyelamatkan dirinya jikalau bangsa itu berdiam diri memeluk tubuh
selama-lamanya. Sudah
semestinya bangsa itu harus memilih suatu antara dua arah - maju atau
mundur. Ini terserah kepada kesanggupan dan kesedaran bangsa itu
menghadapi perubahan-perubahan dan perkembangan-perkembangan.